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THE LIVING TREATY POWER
INTRODUCTION
States are sovereign entities vis-A-vis each other in the international
arena. There are several basic sources from which rules regulating their
conduct toward each other emanate, to wit: treaties, customs and certain
general principles.' The lack of a vertical centralized authority to formu-
late rules governing the conduct of nations is the most salient feature of
today's international law, yet such an authority is assumed to be an
essential part of any mature legal system rather than a luxury. However,
treaties serve the purpose of the next best method of legislation in the
international system: they are rules expressly agreed upon by the
signatories thereto. Conventions, i.e. treaties open to universal sub-
scription, are notably quasi-legislative in character due to their almost
universal application.
Although states are soverign with reference to each other and can,
according to international law, conclude any agreement not contrary to
international law, the government of a given state may be further limited
in its treaty activity by a domestic constitution.' The treaty power of the
United States Government is so limited. This power, its living nature
and the need for an awareness of this characteristic in today's world of
relationships of increasing interdependence among states in their search
for world peace and the advancement of the general welfare of humanity
are the subjects of this paper.
CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCE OF THE POWER
Treaties
The treaty power of the United States is denied to the governments of
the several States and is vested exclusively in the federal government.
The Constitution provides:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confedera-
tion ....
1. The Statute of the International Court of Justice states in reference to the sources
of international law:
The Court whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidenced of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. 1.
2. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MiNN. L. Rv.
709 (1958).
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No State shall, without the Consent of congress, . . . enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign power ....
It further provides:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States ....
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur; . . . .' (Emphasis added.)
Treaties made in accordance with these provisions are the "supreme
Law of the Land."5
In United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp.6 Justice Sutherland
declared the treaty power to rest upon an "inherent power" basis, i.e.
it had devolved upon the United States Government as an inherent power
of sovereign state from the British Government through the Continental
Congress and the Congress of the Confederation. Such a theory has
important implications in the nature of removing the treaty power from
any serious constitutional limitations. However, this view has been suc-
cessfully rebutted and the United States Government held to be entirely
a creature of the Constitution with no other sources of power." Specific
arguments against the inherent treaty power theory and promoting the
delegated power theory go thus: (1) The individual States, in fact, acted
in international affairs under the Continental Congress and the Congress
of the Confederation; this has the effect of breaking any proposed con-
tinuity of succession from the colonial rule of Great Britian to the United
States Government in the international field. (2) The power to amend the
Constitution and to thereby create express limitations upon the treaty
power indicates a treaty power subject to constitutional restrictions. (3)
The theory of a limited power imposes a "practical restraint on the va-
garies of men"; the wisdom of such an approach is in favor of a construc-
tion of the intent of the framers of the Constitution as to create a limited
power.8
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1 and 2.
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880). In case of
a conflict between a Congressional Statute and a Treaty provision, since both are of equal
dignity, the latter in time prevails. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 751.
6. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
7. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
8. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 717-18.
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Executive Agreements
Executive agreements are pacts concluded by the President with foreign
governments by some procedure other than the formal procedure set by
the Constitution for the implementation of treaties.' Such agreements
have the same effect according to international law as does a formal
treaty,10 and must, therefore, be considered in any analysis of the treaty
power.
The law is not clear as to whether there is a constitutional power to
make executive agreements." However, the power can be validly implied
from the Constitution itself. Article I, section 10, indicates the framers
were aware of types of agreements other than treaties by reference to
"Agreements" and "Compacts." Furthermore, the President has power
to negotiate treaties prior to Senate approval, and, in practice, such
executive agreements have been concluded frequently. 2 These factors
plus the need for secrecy and/or swift action in many instances, e.g.,
recognition of foreign governments,'" support well the implied and neces-
sary and proper bases of the power of the President to constitutionally
conclude executive agreements.
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER
As stated above, the treaty power of the United States Government
extends to all matters which are proper subjects according to inter-
national law subject to certain constitutional limitations. 4 There are
three general areas of such limits: the Bill of Rights, the tenth amend-
ments' reserved powers of the States, and the basic structure of the
American system of government.
The Bill of Rights
In Reid v. Covert15 an executive agreement with Great Britain granted
American military courts exclusive jurisdiction to try all offenses com-
mitted by American servicemen's dependents in Great Britain.' 6 The
court martial procedure "does not give an accused trial by jury and
9. Treaties must be approved by the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
10. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 767.
11. Id. at 765. See generally Orfield & Re, INT RNATIOxAL LAW 41-7 (rev. ed. 1965), on
the problem of the internationally binding effect of a treaty concluded under a constitutional
defect.
12. McLaughlin, The Scope oj the Treaty Power in the United States II, 43 MINN. L.
REV. 651 (1958).
13. This was the nature of the source of the executive agreement effecting the Litvinov
Assignments held valid and otherwise treated in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942)
and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
14. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
15. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
16. A similar agreement was in effect with Japan. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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other Bill of Rights protections."' The Court declared this agreement
unconstitutional saying, " . . . no agreement with a foreign nation can
confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government,
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."'" This case is the
strongest one supporting the proposition that treaties and executive agree-
ments are subject to constitutional limitations, particularly in the area
of the Bill of Rights protections.'9
The Tenth Amendment
In Missouri v. Holland"° a treaty permitting the federal government to
regulate conservation of certain migratory birds was upheld in the face
of an attack by the State of Missouri as being an unconstitutional
invasion of the powers reserved to the several States by the tenth amend-
ment. The Court admitted the treaty power was limited by the Con-
stitution generally and the tenth amendment specifically but not in this
situation. The Court found no constitutional prohibition against the
government's dealing with this national problem "of very nearly the
first magnitude."'"
The Basic Form of American Government
It was stated as early as 1890 by the Supreme Court that the treaty
power could never be construed to extend "so far as to authorize what
the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government
or in that of one of the States . . . ." Thus, a treaty which purported
to change the method of selection of United States Congressmen, e.g.,
would be unconstitutional and void.
THE LIVING NATURE OF THE TREATY POWER
Although it is generally admitted that the treaty power is limited as
discussed above, there is strong opinion urging a reassessment of the
extent of these limitations.2' It has been said that a treaty is an inter-
national agreement on a matter of international concern and there is no
matter of international concern with which it cannot deal. Missouri v.
Holland" purportedly made this certain. 5 This is so because the Holland
17. 354 U.S. at 16.
18. Id.
19. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 762.
20. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
21. Id. at 435.
22. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
23. See generally Henkin, Arms Inspection and the Constitution, 11 HASTINGs L. J. 267
(1960); Green, The Treaty Making Power and the Extraterritorial Effect of the Con-
stitution: Reid v. Covert and the Girard Case, 42 MINN. L. Rav. 825 (1958); and Henkin,
The Treaty Makers and the Lawmakers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107
U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959).
24. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
25. Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Lawmakers: the Law of the Land and
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Court found no constitutional prohibition against the government's deal-
ing with the problem of the conservation of migratory birds passing from
the United States to Canada and back; this was a problem of interna-
tional concern being solvable only by the concerted action of the
sovereignties involved. Thus,
Federal authority over international matters, then, is an inde-
pendent power; there is no requirement that the subject matter
of a treaty be of federal concern on some additional basis, under
some other federal power as well.26
Congressional legislation prior to the treaty upheld in Holland aimed
at effecting the same end as the treaty was struck down by United States
District Courts in two separate instances as violating the tenth amend-
ment reserved powers of the States.2 1 States Rightists have, therefore,
interpreted the case as allowing the treaty power to invade the reserved
powers of the States. This was made evident by the proposed Bricker
Amendment to the Constitution. The Amendment would have expressly
declared the treaty power to be limited by the Constitution:
(1) A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitu-
tion shall not be of any force or effect.
(2) A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States through legislation that would be valid in the absence of
treaty.
28
It also provided the executive agreement power would be subject to
Congressional amendment and general treaty limitations. 29
One commentator has reasoned that the Congressional foreign afflairs
power extends as far as the treaty power in reference to all matters of
international concern. Since this is so, the basic assumption of the
Brickerites, i.e. that the power of Congress to deal in foreign affairs is
narrower than the treaty power due to the holding in Missouri v. Holland,
must fall.30 This means that the legislation prior to the treaty could have
been upheld under the Congressional foreign affairs power and the
District Courts in United States v. McCullagh3' and United States v.
Shauver 2 were wrong.
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 903, 908 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Henkin, The
Treaty Makers].
26. Henkin, The Treaty Makers, supra note 25, at 910.
27. United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (1915) and United States v. Shauver, 214
F. 154 (1914).
28. Text of Bricker Proposed Amendment. As Approved by Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, June 4, 1953.
29. Id.
30. Henkin, The Treaty Makers, supra note 25.
31. 221 F. 288 (1915).
32. 214 F. 154 (1914).
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The net effect of the above theory is to remove a tenth amendment
limitation as such from the scope of the treaty power or the congres-
sional foreign affairs power. All that is necessary for a valid enactment
under either power is that the subject be of "international concern" as
determined by the courts."8
Further, it has been recognized that whether a given matter is solely
within the concern of domestic jurisdiction, i.e. a subject for the internal
law of a state alone, or is a matter of international concern, is a relative
question depending on the state of international law at a given point of
time. 4 Hence, the scope of the treaty power is determined by a flexible
and living restriction: that the given subject of a treaty be of valid con-
cern to the United States as a nation vis-h-vis other nations. Such a
principle is not a subterfuge to avoid application of the tenth amendment,
for when a matter is of international concern the United States is
primarily interested in seeing that the other nations involved observe
the given agreement insofar as their activities affect the United States."
Therefore, a matter such as the conservation of the migratory birds in
Missouri v. Holland"6 was at one time within the jurisdiction of the
states but only defeasibly so. When it developed to a stage of interna-
tional concern it was clearly recognized to be the proper subject of a
treaty. Such a theory is analogous to the development of the scope of
the interstate commerce power of Congress.
APPLICATION OF THE LIVING NATURE THEORY
Human Rights
A significant application of this theory would be to authorize the
President of the United States and Senate to bind the United States by
formal treaty to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by
the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948.17 The movement
and welfare of the peoples of the world today are definitely of such a
character as to allow them to be validly classified as matters of interna-
tional concern. With the apparent polarization of the races in the world
today evidenced by violent racial disturbances in the United States, the
condition of Apartheid in South Africa, and the current movement in
England to stop the immigration of "colored people" into that country,
etc., the acceptance by the United States of the Declaration as binding
law would be a strong force in encouraging other nations to do the same
in working toward a solution to the threatening world catastrophe. Such
a proposal is not impracticable among nations, for a Convention of Human
33. Henkin, The Treaty Makers, supra note 25, at 922 & 932.
34. See Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, [19231 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4.
35. Henkin, The Treaty Makers, supra note 25, at 912-13.
36. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
37. U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
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Rights has been signed among several of the European sovereignties
authorizing enforcement by individuals of certain basic rights against
their national governments directly."
A basic stumbling block to having the United States agree to such a
treaty is the acceptance of the proposition that the regulation of positive
remedies for the assertion of certain basic rights lies within the jurisdic-
tion of the individual States rather than with the federal government.
Under this theory it is only by piecemeal use of the interstate commerce
power that scattered civil rights laws are enacted giving limited and
tenuous protection of human rights. Under the United Nations Declara-
tion an individual would have a direct remedy against the state or person
violating such rights in a "national court." Article 8 of the Declaration
provides:
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the Constitution or by law.
All that is necessary to overcome the reserved power problem is to prove
that the issue of human rights in this dimension is of international con-
cern, and this cannot be denied.
Disarmament
A lessening of the constitutional limitations on the treaty power would
also bear fruit from another aspect. Disarmament or, short of that, arms
inspection, is a most desirable objective in the search for peace in today's
world. However, the United States Constitution creates a great problem
by its guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.39 To insure
no violations of disarmament agreements may at sometime require in-
spection by arms inspectors of factories, laboratories, depots, large
estates, etc., in private hands.4 9 To inspect private places there must be
a search warrant or probable cause to believe a violation of the law has
occurred therein. It is extremely unlikely that warrants from national
courts would be adequately available. Therefore, the necessary searches
authorized by treaty would, no doubt, have to be justified on the inde-
pendent ground of some probable cause without more. An argument for
such a procedure against constitutional limitation could be based on
several approaches.
Basically, a broad treaty power would suffice. A treaty power limited
only by the necessity that the matter be of international concern and of
38. For the text of the Convention see 45 Am. J. INT'L. L. Sups. 24 (1951).
39. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
40. Inspection of government installations presents no such constitutional difficulty
since the government is not protected by the fourth amendment nor is it bound to secrecy.
See Henkin, Arms Inspection and the Constitution, 11 HASTINGS L. J. 267, (1960).
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extreme domestic importance would be sufficient to permit a relaxation of
the fourth amendment requirement of a warrant for search of private
places.4 ' The issue of arms control and inspection is without doubt of the
utmost international concern in today's world where the number of
nations with nuclear arsenals grows constantly, creating not only a domes-
tic threat but a threat to all mankind. Aside from practical difficulties of
negotiating the arms inspection agreement, therefore, the Constitution in
the fourth amendment limitation should not stand in the way. Further-
more, the United States would want a reciprocal right to inspect private
establishments in other nations parties to the treaty, such searches would
be extremely unlikely and the power of inspection would be less like a
police power than a limited power extremely necessary and in a limited
group. 42
Status of Forces
Another illustration of the need and wisdom of a broader treaty power
is presented by one commentator in a treatment of the extraterritorial
effect of the United States Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights
in reference to status of United States Armed Forces in foreign coun-
tries.43
In Reid v. Covert44 an executive agreement was declared unconstitu-
tional because it denied Bill of Rights protections-particularly trial by
jury-to dependents of members of United States servicemen by requir-
ing military courts-martial for offenses against the laws of Great Britain.
However, in Wilson v. Girard4' a United States soldier was tried in a
Japanese court for killing a Japanese by firing an expended cartridge
from a grenade launcher into a crowd on a firing range. The problem was
that Japan had given up its jurisdiction over offenses committed by
American military personnel in the scope of their official duty and the
United States had agreed to give up its right to try such persons if Japan
considered a given case of particular importance. 46 The Court found no
constitutional nor legislative prohibition against the waiver of American
jurisdiction in this case. The petitioner was neither denied nor entitled to
any constitutional protection.
The important problem presented by these cases is to determine the
extent of constitutional protection to be extended to American citizens
41. See generally Henkin, Arms Inspection and the Constitution, 11 HASTINGS L. J.
267 (1960).
42. Id. at 280. Cf. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
43. See Green, supra note 22.
44. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
45. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
46. Generally, a sovereign state has the exclusive right to punish offenses against its laws
committed within its jurisdiction. Japan here had given up part of this jurisdiction condi-
tionally. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
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abroad, at least to servicemen and their dependents. An informed answer
to this question is that the "problems of accommodating national sover-
eignty to a world in which international cooperation becomes more and
more necessary cry out for" a ruling that the Constitution is not uni-
versally applicable abroad and that the treaty making power of itself
supplies constitutional support for a treaty attacked on some other con-
stitutional grounds."7
Where there is increasing interdependence among nations and the
stationing of American troops in foreign countries is accepted as common-
place the Girard-type accommodation of United States and foreign
sovereignties is increasingly necessary. In other words, the United States
should focus on guaranteeing fundamental human liberties such as a
trial of some kind for criminal charges but not necessarily a trial by jury,
i.e. there need not be an absolute guarantee of the peculiar procedures
of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence embodied in the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The United States Government is most certainly a creature of the
United States Constitution; this statement applies to the treaty power
as well as to all other powers of the federal government. However, the
Constitution is a living document and the exact extent of any limitations
at any given point in time is not rigid. As America grows and also as the
world community of states develops, the Constitution with its various
grants of powers and limitations must adapt to the needs of America and
the world.
The growing interdependence of states in the international arena de-
mands an expanded treaty power. Such an expansion with the effect of
narrowing the traditional basic limitations on the treaty power is feasible
under the view of the power as limited only by the necessity that its
subject matter be of international concern, rather than formalistic tenth
amendment and Bill of Rights limitations.
The need for a centralization of power as a society develops and
becomes more and more complex is attested to by the centralization of
power internally in the United States via the growth of the interstate
commerce power of the United States Congress. Such a complex develop-
ment is coming upon us more rapidly in the international society of which
the United States is a most important and influential member. This
phenomenon is bringing with it many problems of utmost concern to all
mankind, especially in the area of human rights and world peace. The
world cannot afford to wait much longer for an expanded use of the treaty
power of the United States to aid most significantly in dealing with these
matters of international concern.
Charles R. Passafiume
47. Green, supra note 22, at 843.
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